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Perhaps the most i;,,poi·tant aspect of direct foreign investment is 
that it is an.ir1stru8ent of international business integration. It is 
a means by which a f irrn can o~m manufacturing facilities and distribution 
outlets in foreisn countries ~nd exercise direct control over their de-
cisions on production and sale.s. Direct investment pt::rrnits ;m enlc::rgc­
m·ent across internationnl bordE:rs of the srian_ of activities covered in 
the :decision-r:w.king center of a sfoglc f irr.1., nnd :i.ts cxpc?,nsion in recent 
years can be taken as a ceasuie-of the .~xtent of vertical and horizon-
tal :i.ntcrnational integration an<l thc i11.crcased ir.!porumce of l!\llltin2.­
tional firms, What is the impact of these nultinetio~al firms on inter-
national trade and factor movements? Large in size, broad in scope) 
they frequently occupy a major, if not domine.nt, position in their in­
dustry on a world-wide basis. To what e;~tent do they increase trade, 
cause technology to grow and spread rapidly, and help cipital to move 
freely? 1'0 what extent do they inhibit inefficient exchange? Would 




On the positive side, it is-argued that multinational firms, be-
cause of their access to capital, technology,. and markets in many coun-
tries, can take advantage of discrepancies in world prices, and"in so 
doing, help correct then and brine about better integration of the world 
economy. The multinational firm ~snuf2ctures ~~12re costs ere low and 




j_nvests it uhere it is 1wst procluct_iv.e.. It spreads the superior 
technology of on2 c6untry to other countries in uhich it operates. It 
is able to.do this to the extent that the internal burtaucracy of the 
firm transmits inf ormc.1 ticin more rep idly than international markets, -.rnd 
overcomes barriers to trade r,iore easily anc1 cffid.ently. The firm in 
these cases subst:i.tutes for imperfect mc-:ckets in e.llocatin8 goods and 
factors. 
Against this must be set the problems created by the large size 
and dominant position of some of the important multinational firms. 
Direct investment vould not be_ the matter of great concern that it is 
if it consisted of many small firms scattercc1 throughout the ccohOi1 y, 
each occupying a minor part of the industry and beh2.':7ing j_n a competi--
ti~ely determined f2shion. Instead, much of it is 2ssociated with a 
small muuber ~f large firms in oligopolistic :i.nclustrics. Insofar as 
there is a maj-or problem associc;tcd with rml tinational firms, ·much or it 
lies in the fact that, in these cases, competition is wecik and the finu 
bas market power. If market forces compel behavior, there is little 
po5.nt in investigating, as is often done, whether foreign firms ex-
.... , 
port more, treat labor better, reinvest more 5 etc. Performance would 
depend on supply c1nd dewand, and it would be bette!" to focus atten­
tion on these forces than on th~ firm itself~ But it is an entirely 
different 0atter in industries where a firm, by re·ason of its dominant 
position, has scope for choice. Rere it certainly rnak~s sense· to ex-
amine perform~nce, n~t- only from the econbmic point of vie~, but fro~ 
the polit:lc2:l side as ,;-;211. Large con~c:ntrations of po,10r in priv2te 
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corporations c.an havC'. serious politic.al cor,.,r:;equcnc2.s which nrc consid-· 
erahly :.:,.ggravatec1 uhcn the firm is 11ot · only J.a~:ge $ but for.eign, -and 
American at that, 
If not pressed too far, there is much to be learned by comparing 
the problei:\S currently cree.ted by the rnultin:ottionc1l firms with devel-
opruents in the United States at th6 end of the nineteenth century. 
The cmereence of nat:ional firms uhich acco;:ipz:nj_cd the development of a 
nati9nal market at that time helped, as Rincllcberger poi~ts out 1 to 
equalize wages, interests, and rents within the United States. 2 But it 
a~so led to widespread fears and the antitrust laws. There was great 
suspid.oni sonctirnes justified, someti.nes not, of the po1.-;er of these 
new industrial giants to create serious econmdc problems thro;_13h the 
suppression of competition and serious political problems through the 
concentration of power, Concern about ."the fate of small producers 
driven out of business or depri~ed of ~he opportunity to enter it by 
1 all-powerful aggregates of capital'" and about 11 the power of monopolists · 
to hurt the public by raising.price 1 det~riorating products, and restrict­
ing production" was a pri-nciple ~otive behind the Sheman Act·. 3 On ·the 
political side, "concentration of resources in the hm1<ls of a few was 
viewed as a •Social and politice.l catastrophe," a belief, as Ka;l_sen and 
Turner point out, ,-~hich "can be rationalized in terr:is of Jeffer~;onian 
symbols of wide political appeal and grc~t pcrsisteuc~ i~ American life: 
busit1ess units are poliiicall.y irresponsible and therefdre large busi-
ness unJts 2re Cl ....::>'"'"l~o'-"·0 rOL"SI • 114 
The sinilarity bet•,,eer. the Ame.ricc::n f e2.rs of the 12.rge corpprcttion 
~nd· the ones now voiced in Europe to~2r~~ t11c cultin2t{nnal corporation 
--· ··- .• . ____ ._: 
suor-ests n closer lo.ok at the A:uerican r.ntitrust l2ws desi_~ned to <lcal"'"' -
with this problem. Th~se are f«r froi:1 perfect, e.nd serve more a9 a uoc1-
el to be stt•died than 0"1e to be copied, but they do provide a large b,ody 
of experience on the pi."_ocess of examining, ev2luating, and attempted 
r·emedying of problems of industrial organization. For example, it has 
at ti'mes been found necessary in the Un:i.ted States to br:i.ng about: a dis­
solution of giant fin11s (e.g., Standard Oil and American Tobacco in 1911) 1 
to subsidize new conpetitors (e.g., in the aluminum industry), to pre­
vent mergers, and to curtail the firm's choice of.sales methods (e.g., 
United Shoe }!achinery, Internationa·l Business Hach:.i.nes), to n2me a few 
cases. ~-)hiJ.e one ce.nnot judge t•:hether similar ac~_ion is nezc1ed in the 
international context without much n1ore inforrn=1tion them t-:c no~-1 have 
available, the United States antitrust experience seerns a useful ave-
nue to explore in looking for precedents for collective action on for-
eign investment. 
The most important lesson perhaps is the difficulty of applying 
antitrust laws, partly due to the weaknes.? of OL1r- tools of economic a:-, 
nalysis and partlr clue to an inherently apbiguous attitude. Fortas poin~s 
out that there has always been in the United States an ambivalent atti-
tude to--rards big business) a "ror,w.ntic view of the achicver,1ents and cf- • 
ficicncy of large industrial organizations" coupled with a "suspiciot1s 
vlet-1 of their pCi•!er. 115 This is paralleled _in the ~conct'li~ literature 
by disagreement on whether large size inhibits performance because of 
the lack of co~~etition or irnprov2s it b2caus2 of eco~o~ies of scnl2. 
~imilarly, on the international scene most countries find theoselves 
in~ dilcm~a w~en formulating policy on foreign inv2st~cnt; on the one 
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hanp., they focl they need the contribution that foreign capitd c:mcl tech­
nology can make, and on the other, they fear the l2rgc corporation .. 
The c1Hf iculti~s of separating out the acl.vantazes ancr . dange.rs of. : 
large firms should not be minim:i.zed, but neither should they deter us 
from a serio:..1s conside.re.tion of the great changes in industrial struc-
ture no\.; occurring. The United States laws probc.bly uorked more to pre--
vent overt collusion than to prevent high concentration. The increase 
in concentration came about before 1900 and little was done to reverse 
it, though the antitrust laus m.?.y have prevented it from increasing. 
"The struggle against si.ze \·1as _· largely lost in the merger movement of 
. 6 
1897-1901," writes E. S. Fason, ancl. the lesson of this for the inter-
national ecorior.1y is perhaps thzt now is a propitious time to act, while 
things are still in a state of flux. There is a danger that the present 
policy, more concerned with collusiv~ agreaments than market shares, 
and with nationality rather than r.iarl~et pouer, will permit large increase 
in concentration in international markets which \·Till later become dif-
ficult if not impossible to reverse. The rev~rsal of policy towards 
.....
cartels may prevent overt collusion but encourage merger, while the at-
tempt to countervail American firms may lead to amalgamations that re-
duce concentration, (e.g., present developments in the automobile in­
dustry). The result may be new restrictions on trade by firms, to off-
set the gains from removing the old restrictions by_goveirt~ent. 
The historical record on direct investoent strengthens the sense 
of urgency, for it suggests that patterns oice set teri<l to ~r~vail for 
lonz periods of ti~2. The basic patter~ of.direct inv2st~~nt.aroie early 
in this century atid ch~nged little in the noiwal course of events. }~st 
-6-
of the fj_rms nou c1ord,!i'.!nt bc'.gan their operations before 191!; ac1ct some 
even bef6re tJ1at. 
7 
There was little tendency for their position to be 
eroded through time. Their branch plants and subsidiaries, instead of 
~ithering a0ay, expanded more o~ less at the same rate ~s their indu~f~j, 
and on the averaf;.:!, maintained their market share. 8 If this past :i.s ·any 
~r:J.teria, ve nw.y hazard the guess that a neu pattern will crnerge out 
of the gr"eat changes no·t.-1 occurring, and thDt it too will remain stable 
for a long period. N01:-1 t-:ould sce~t a eood time to decide uhich mm pat-
.. . 9





. ) ,. t' . ' h . . l , . • •experience or 11~ eviaencc on f h .t ,e size- an~ mar~et position o· t e im-
po_rtant rnultinatio0~l f:i.n~1s. !1s the d2ta are vc-..:y inco1!1plete) only teu-
ta~ive conclusi0ns can be drawn from them, but a few consistent charac-
teristics se6ra to emerge. 
The American finis that· account for the bulk of direct investment 
are fet-1 in nurnher and large in size. AccorcH.nB to the 1957 Census (the 
latest available), the 50 largest investors account for 60 per cent of 
the total United States direct investrne11t~ \-1hile the 100 largest account 
for over 70 per cent, and th~ 300 larg~st for over 90 per cent. 10From 
annual reports, it was possible to identify 90 of ~he largest of these 
and obtain an estlraate of their present_sizc. Their distribution in 
- llterms of their total assets in 196l: uas as f ollous: · 
Asset siz'2 Hurilber of firr;i.s Cumulative. 
(dollc1rs) in each class numbe1: of fin.1s 
over 10 billion 2 2 
2 1/2 to 10 billion 8 J.O 
1 to 2 1/2 billion 20 30 .... . 
500 million to 1 billion 20 50 
200 to 500 million 30 80 
100 to 200 million 10 90 
These leading direct investors seem often to be in industries ~~1ere 
there are only a fe1-1 firms, each Hit!, a larze share of the 17?.ctrket. A 
rough COD!:)c..rison of the mc:i.jor United States investors •:ith the A:n2ric2.n 




dust~ies uhere the concc~tretion ratio is greater than 75 per cent. 
For the Ui.1it:cd States as a whole, the correspondine figure is much lo•;-ier; 
only 8 per cent of the total value of shipraents occurs in indLlstrics 
\1here the. conccnt"cetion ratio is higher thcc1n 75 per cent~ 2 Dunrdng 's 
·detailed stucly for the United Kingdom sho,-,ed in striking fashion thnt 
nearly every Americ2n branch plant was in an industry ~-here it u2s the 
clominant producer or one of a small nurnber of producers. As Dunnin~ 
summa~fzed, 11 three quarters cf the employrnen~_in the United States af-
filiated firmi is concentrated in industries 1j1ere the five largest com-
•·13petitors zupp1y Bc: 0 percent . . f ' 1 h 1 • or more o~ tne tota __ output. Ot er stucies 
'J.l:E 'I 1 l1n• ·canaoa; •urope~lS ~- lG' h d ·1' 11anc. .,ustr,::>.112: tnout3,. ess eta1 en anc cs.s conc_u·· 
si':7e, point in the sam2 dir.ection. 
It cou12 be argued that the association of hieh concentration and 
d5.rect investnent is not accidental, but is inherent in the very nature 
of the subject. 
I 
This provides atlded support for looking at direct in-
vestment iri terms of oligopoly, though the primary justification is to 
be found in the facts on market structure themselves rather than this 
tentative hypothesis on their cause. Ouning an enterpries in a foreign 
country can be exceedingly costly due to the exchange ris!:s involved, 
the difficulty of obtaining inforr.iation and coordinatin.:; over. . long dis-
tances, the disaclv2ntsg~s of being foreign, etc. Some special features 
~re needed to offset these disadvantages, and these ari no~ likely to be 
found in cm2petitive industries ~-,here entry is e:::.sy. ~-Yhere thi:!re are 
n6 large econo~ies of scale or lars~ differences in cost curves or prod-
uct differentiation, national firms ~ill have the edvant23e and_w{ll 
pred6minete. But where entry is difficult, an ·incenti~e to'•forci~n 
• 
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investment arises. For exar~le, if a firm has an adv~ntaee - a patent, 
a differenti~tcd product, a superior technical kno\1ledgc: a better access 
to. capital - it c2n offset the dis~dvantage of bein3 foreirn, The stronger 
.the advant~ge, the grenter the ability to overcome the disadvantage, and 
alRost by definition> the highe~ the degree·6f concentration. Moreover, 
the decision on wh2ther the advantage can be sold and the bother of direct 
ownership of a foreign subsidiary avoided is critica~ly ?ffected by the 
presence Qr absence of other barriers to entry. If the advantage is to 
be 11.censed, rentec.1, or otherwise sold to a l2;rr;e nunber of buyers ·who 
act as price takers, it may be easy to maximize qeasi rents by setting 
the monopoly price and selling to all taters. But if, due to economies 
of scale or oth2r factors, there .are only a feu ffrms in the industry, 
, the f irrn selling the advantage f ir.cls_ itself in a bilateral olisopoly 
.. sfruatiori and nay need dir.ect imiestr.1ent to obtain the maxi1:iun: return. 
l • 
I 
For this reason we sometir-.1es even find olizopolistic firms from different 
countries establishing subsidiaries in each others' countries, in order 
to utilize their adv2ntage rather than selling it to their competitors. 
Even in the absence of differences in technology or product diff'er-
entiation, barriers to entry arisin3 fror:1 econo~ies of scale can lead 
to direct invest~ment, if it results :in highly j:r.iperfect international 
. 
markets. Direct investment may,then be need~d as 2 bargaining sirategern.
' 
A firm in one count_ry 8ay, through direct inve.strr,ent. merge with its 
c6:npetitor or est;:,.blish a fo.rei3n subsidiclry in order to gain a strategic 
-advantage; 2 buyer of a raw material rnay ~se direci investment to cir-
cl!:-:vf,,,t 2n irnIJerfect t:J.rl'.Ct 2r.d oht&in its ra.,1 oate~ial r:io1·e che2pl:;. 
.. 
·-10-
Whenever competition in international Datkets is imperfect, there will 
be mutual interdepcn~2nce of enterprise i~ different countries and in-




How arc ,ie to cvalurtte th2 impact of direct j_nvcst1:1cnt? Suppose 
an icdustry consists of a f ('.U large American fin·,s prevented by anti­
trust 1aFs from ovc:rt collusion an<l a l<irgc1·_ number of European firms 
pei"haps cooperating in c>. cc.:rtel 2.rrc:mgc;:1ent. A change in internat:i.o"iwl 
economic conditions le,:i.ds to the invasion of the Europe2.n market by A-
' .
merican. _firms. The Ar.!e.rica~1 f j.rms m2y lwve a decisive advantage 5 in 
which case they acquire a lc1r3e: share o.f the E1Jropc,.m market: or the 
European firms m2.y be able to cour..ter Americ<1n entry by mcrgin3 into large 
firms,. i.e., become m~ltinational th~~selvcs.- In either case, the result 
.is a few giant firms, American end Europe2n > ~-,h:i.ch cloMinate the indus-
try anc1 eventually set_tle into so;:1c oli3opolistic collusion, tacit or 
overt. Will ~crforrnance in this industry be bctt~r than it was after 
this r2.dical change in industrial organization? TTill it be as good as 
it could be? Hhich countries benefit? T-)hich are hurt? The problem 
is so <lifficult that one hardly knows where to be5in. Huch h2s changed 
in the in<lustry; there was not a golden age of efficiency at the begin­
ning, nor at the enc1. I propose in this paper to break the problera 
and deal uith one or tuo aspects that isolate major issues. It seems..., 
useful for these purposes to treat separately the problems of con:rnodity 
flows, technology, and c2.pitalJ e.nd · to discuss the positive and negative 
forces at work in each crlse. This does not permit over-a11 ·conclusions, • 
but it does help nal:c a start. 
Direct invest~ent can changeboth the location of productibn and the 
competitive structure of the industry. To illustrate the effects on 
the flow of eoo<ls, consider an of scale provide 
,n important harrier to entry. Tl1c industry _8ay nonetb~less be conpet-
itive if transport costs 2rc low and wi<lcspre~d consumption provides 
an intern2tional market large enough .to support cany fir19G, lu this 
co~pctitivc case, production will be concentrated to tnke fullest ad-
vantage of ec?no~ies of scale; each firm will operate at a point wl1ere 
costs are rising, price will be cq~al to marginal costs, and only nor-
mal profits will be earned • 
. -
Suppose instead thst the to~al world nar~et is small, relative to 
the optimum size plant, and there is room for only a fev producers. 
These ·oligopolists, recoenizing the mutual interdepcc<lence of their 
actions, ,1il~ not co~pete to th~ point of driving price to ~arginal 
costs, but ,.,ill most likely cooperete to restrain cori1pe.tition ai,d to 
enhance profits. Two types of inefficiency are likely to prevail in 
tioi_!_ measured by the excess of price over roc?.rginal costs. .In order 
to ma:i:ntain abnormel profits, the firms will jointly res.train output 
and raise price, and under the usual assumptions, ~his leads to a mis-
allocation of resources. Sec~n<l, there will most likely be also an 
internation2.l _t_rade ~~is tort ion because production will not be concen- ... _ 
trated to obtain maximu~ advantage of econoraies of scale. Cartel agree­
ments and especially inforFlal collusio~s are seldo~ strong enough to 
cut out production by ineffici~nt firms; instead they often act ~s an
I 
umbrella to protect a ceitain number of high cost producers. Costs 
are therefore likely to be higher than under perfect competition be-
cause of inefficient allocation. 
merge throu~h direct investment into one international parent firt 
---- .. 
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owning nncl controlling all production c>.nd i:!2.XJ.,~t1ZJ.n0 global profits? 
The pn~vious cartel~ ·haii1pcre<l by c>.ntitrus~ 12.r,;s '1~·tc1 the inherent dif­
ficulty of securj_n~: co,~:pJ.cte ar.reement, ~-•as unable to achieve r:w;d.mum 
joi.nt pr_ofit. Direct investoent Hill remove some of tlv~se obst2.c.les, 
and more perfect coordination will be possible, as the multinational 
firm will be free to mmdmize prof its fully. The improved coordination 
will increase one of the distortions noted above and decrease the other. 
First, the integrated £inn, by raising price to the point of 6aximurn 
.profits, vill increase dortortion due to monopoly power. Second, in 
an opposite direction, the fiJm will be free to allocate production 
in the most effective manner. It 0111 b~ able to close down ineffi-
cient producers and concentrate production to minimize costs. The cost 
curve of the indust~-:y ~-Jill b2 lm1ered, perhaps even to the extent of 
1eading. to a f·a·11 ' · ' 17in prices to tne consumer. 
Internatioriril integration of business through direct investment 
usually stops short of being _complete; instea·d. of one dominant firm, 
there are several with branch plants and s~bsidiaries in v~rious coun­
_tries, neither colluding completely or competing completely. Indus- '· 
tries such as this are often cyclical, and havz pcri_o<ls of intense 
competition followed by relative quiet~ At a.tice such as the present 
·when ne.w i:wrkets are opened up arid ne\,r trade p'atterns created, coI:Jpe- •• 
titian is likely to intensify as firms establish strategic positio~s. 
t-Ihen the new changes are absorbed, the industry may then settle· into 
a .period of ·stability of market shares 2.nd collus ion on prices. The 
effect of any specific act of direct invcstncnt is thus ~rabi8uous· it 
may be po.sitive or nes.2.tive dependin~ µpor, t- 1heth•~r it increases corilpe­
\ 
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titian ~r decre~scs it, whether it improve3 the firm's ability to pro-
duce efficiently or lessens it. Our judRcment of the present flow 
of direct investic.~nt depends very r:.uch on our horizon. In rnost cnses) 
the entry of United St~tes firra.s into ~urope has p~sHive effects in-_ 
stimulating COi,:~ctition and inproving resource allocation, often to 
the disquiet of existinc firms. But if the current increase in com­
petition :lS bought at the .expense of increased r.12:rket power in tEe 
long run due to a reduction of the nunber of firms, the short-run 
gains ~ay be more thnn offset by long-run lois6~. 
-· 
IV 
In most cases of direct investment~ the key el0Jent is the trans-
fer of ·technology and cntrcpreneurt;hi:.l. •Finns clrc very uiwqual in 
their ability to 0_2ercJ.te in industry: tl~cy vary in sl:.ill, eff idcncy, 
_-resources, etc. 3 end di.rect investment i~; a uay in \-1hich a firm with 
so;ne a.dv[mtc•.ge can put it to use in ct fcrc:ign country. The Amed.can 
firm t!1at e:-:tablishes or expands a subsic1J.2ry in Europe is usually 
using some kind of superiority it has over at least some of its Eu-
ropea~ rivals - more experience in techniques_ of mass production, 
more experience with certain consu~er good~ more ~Jiclely used in the 
United Sietei, bettei eccess to-technology developed throu3h the war 
effcn:t, che8.p capital fror:i their 0 1.m larr,est resources or from spe-
cial -contact uith the New York capital market, a favored positioP in 
hiring skilled 1\v:ericc1n pe!'sonnel 3 or· a lop cost source of rau mate-
rial through their dirett investments i~ underdeveloped countries. 
Similarly, the European and• Canadian firms ,-.-·hich engaec in 9i­
rect investment usually have some advantage Enablinc thim to over­
come the difficulty cf operating abroad and to meet local competition, 
Interestinr,ly enoueh. thE!SC firris tencl to be in· the same industries as 
·the American multinatior.al fir.ms,. shoi-ling t}1at technolory, entrepre­
neurship, and product differentiaiion are not one-way streets. The 
petroleurn 3 soft drinks, paper, s6ap, far~ machinery, business machines, 
tires and tubes 3 s~1ing machines, concentrated milk products, and 
biscuit industries all provide examples in recent yec1rs w~ere Am~rican 
finis h«ve large foreign investr:1c:1ts r.:nd one of the fin.1s oper2ti:1p, 
in the United States is 2 branch plant 6f a forei~n firm. ... 
The subsidiary of a wultin2tional fir~ can therefore usually 
• 
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supply consu8cr goods or producer goods at lower cost than at least some 
national f:i.rr!!s; the c1irc·ct investE:.ent thLts •!.i:111rovcs ccono1;1ic pi:!rforn:<1nce 
by_makinc capital and technology from one ~ountry available to another. 
This cs_pect is often stressed in the trade literature .as the mo.st im-
portant fcncU.on of direct investment:. the multinationnl firm, by apply-
ing the most advanced technical and ~anagerial sl~il!s.to its operations
.
througl1out the world, facilitetcs the flow of technology arid entreprc-
neurial ability between countries, and helps bring about international 
cost equalization. 
A so.iic,,:hat ciif f crcnt point of view can be found in some of the 
. .
antitrust literature) about the bsst way to proDote technology an~ 
~ntrepreneurial efficiericy. There, it is stressed that the advan­
tage a firm possesses is a barrier to entry of othe:r finr:s. The 
greater' the advantage, the greater the barrier to entry, and the less 
the degree of ,competition. Attentior, is thus focused on ways to lo1-1crI 
these barriers and increase competition. In some cases, it is sug-
gested that in order to promot~ competition, firms be prevented from 
using fully their advantaees and forced instead to make them available 
to their competitors on an equaf basis. This always has two ~ides. 
Restrictions on the use of an advantage filay prevent its fullest use 
and inhibit the'dlscovery of new ones. On the other hand, if there 
I 
are no restiictions and the firm
I 
obtains a monopoly position, the 
price paid for the 2dvantage rnay be too high, and future innovation 
inhibited because of the lack of competition. 
The antitrust tradition leans toHards co~~ctifion r2th2r than· 
size to obtain efficiency and srrn-,th. r~ysen 2.nd Turner, in their 
\ 
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sora8~1tt radical (fro □ the paint of view of existing practice) approach, 
i " ..sugce~t tnat t_nc burd2n of proof be on the f in1s to j ust.ify their size 
and th~t doubts should be resolved nfr1 favor of reducin~ market po1,1er 
- . 
' • f ... • t • • •~ 11ra tncr trwn maJ.n u1n1ns l l-. An important ground for their belief 
is an assumption that adventagcs are perhaps transitory and that 
rathe~ than allo11in~ the~ to lead to iPcrcascs in concentration, it 
is better to protect long-nm effid.cncy by maintdnin6 numbers. 
111~.rge penwnent differences in econor,1ic effic:i.cncy amoPg f in:1s 11 they 
feel; m.·c lieither non-e:-dstent or rare'· ar.d 111-,here a particul2r firm 
~oes have an 2dvantage in men and methods, rivals can and uill copy 
- ,.18
the ·methods and hire the m~n. ,-
The antitrust approach can be ap?lied to the. international econo1:1y 
as uell. The beneficial side of direct investcc~t. is t~at it allows 
firms freedom to apply their c.dvantap,es thr"ouehout the '\·1orld. Phether 
this forci is ~lw~ys the cheapest vay to spiead existing technology 
and the surest t•:ay to promote ne~-, ones is another r.1atter. If the f irrns 
were restricted sornew~at in their choice, better results might be ob­
tained. In other words, so~e advantages· possessed by fin-:is fro □ one.. _· 
country-may be vie0ed as barriers to entry and ways sought to break 
them clown rather than nwintP..in thcr:i. 
Would it be pos-sible in s0:-::i,2 cases to obtain the adn.ntage through 
licensing, or at a lower cosi? Surprisingly little attention has been 
pa:i.cl to this probler;i. The argument that international firms c1re needed 
to transfer technolory rapidly inplics t!:at no other alternative is 
available. Phy is it not possible ·to h2vc intcrnetional ra~rkct~ for 
technology instead of relyinr on the ~ureaucracy 6f firms? This sub-
. - -18-
jcct is too complicated to go into in detail here, but it is in~orttn~ 
to note that there need not be a har~o~y of interest between the fi~m's 
choice of the best \-,ay to transfer Hs advant~ge - i.e., the vay which -
m·md.mizcs ;tts profits - and the best. choic~ for tbe country·- i.e., the 
·one which aJ.lo,-,s it to obtain the advantage at lm-:er cost. In smn.e cases, 
the firm chooses c!ire:ct investr,1c11t ·with its attcn<lent c1if ficul ties 
because it iLlproves cffic~ency and removes uncertainty, but in other 
cases the 0otive is to protect its position from other firms, to escape 
regulc:1U.on, or to obtain maxirrn1m quasi rents. It is intere.sting to note 
that J[1.pc;1.nJ ..which has f ollo~12c1 a very str:i.ct pol:Lcy on direct inv~straent, 
seems to have had considcruble success in obtairli1~g, through licensing 
aereements, sor:2e of t:1e adv~ntc1ges other countries obtain through direct 
investment. 
Another questi~n is \-Jhether direct. investment is th_e best way to 
promote <lynar:iic technological change. Suppose an American firm:1 by dint 
of its superior technology or access to capital, is able to. take over 
a sj_gnificant shore of a foreign industry previously cons is tine of a t~um­
ber of small firms. On the one hand, there are the benefits flowing 
from the greater efficiency of the American firm: against this must be 
set the worsening of the corr\petitive structure. Is the resultir>.g hi.eh- • 
Ily concentrated industry· the best structure to promote innovatio2? 
Might it not be desirable to prosote coopetition in this industry even 
at the risk of short-term inefficiency? Suppose, for example, that re-
stricticns ~,ere pla.c~c en the P..neric2.n fiY.:1 1 s marl..et share 2r.d it uas 
·;.. 
nology Hhich n:l.r,ht very ucll grou throur1~ tine. As the gq: increased, 
the cost of this restrict5.\•e policy 11ou_ld ('.;ror-; lari;;er, but so uould the 
vote expanded effort to correctir~·their deficiencies 2nd iP the pr6cess 
p~rhaps even discover few ways su~erior to those-of the Pmerican firm. 
To par~phrase Kaysen ~nd Turner~ can ve 2ssuRQ that large permanent 
differences between nations arc unli~e]y end that even thou~h firms from 
a particular country have an aev2ctage et one point in time, other cac 
learn to do just as uell. In other Horrls > it might p3y to protect son:e 
ineffici6nt firmi in order to encoura~c conpctiti0n in research an2 ~e-
_velopr:ient. If: overdone, this policy coulc:1 lend to ?-reat Faste 2nd in-
efficien~y, but if h2ndled judiciously 2nd accorn~anied by other measures 
to improve the co~munication of technolo~y, it mi~ht be sensible in 
some instances. 
There is therefore so:ne ser:.se to interferin~ ·r;7ith dfrect investment 
on the grounds of the infant firm arpument f0r protecti0~. Indeed~ the 
case appears stronger than for the infant industry ar~u~cnt 1 under uhich, 
'·sometimes, a tariff is j_p1posecl anc! foreien firr..s are nlloFed or ever! 
encouragec to e~:"tablish branch plaP.ts. The country obtains an inefficient -· 
industry. t-ihile the forei~n fin, obtains ~ ·suhsiciy plus a larr,e sh~re of 
• 
whatever learning docs occur. 
I 
This is not to sug~est th~t nBtional firms 
should be pronot~d merely on the ~rounds of nationality; r~the~ that it 
might p~y to protect firms on the 8rounds of variety~ The ide~.1 cas~ 
vould be to have niny multin2ti0~2l fir□ s. 
V 
Direct inve.strn<:.n t recovered much norc rc::picl.ly t'.1211 portfoJ.io in-
vestment after the war. As a re~ult, multinational firms have been one 
6f the main instru2ents for the international transfer of private long~ 
term capitol in recent years. TTe night briefly consider here one or 
two. poiz:its on the c-.bility of the r:iultinatior:2.J. fin:! to :;uhstitutc for 
banks and other fin2ncial inter2ediaries 1~ the efficient allocation of 
the world's capital. 
-To begin, consider the role of wultinatio11~1l fin'ls in H world \·!here 
.international financial institutions are dcquate and capital markets are 
relatively perfect. In that c2se, ~irect investnent would have little 
effect on the structure of interest rates or 011 t~e intornational ello-
cation of capital. In this perfect 11orla, a multination3l firm's choice 
between raisin~ funds i~ ~e~ York or Paris tiill have little effect on 
'the ultinc:te pattern of c2pitel flor1. If it borro,,~ecl in r~eF Yor!-:.~ it 
would cause the interest rate there to rise end capital Poul<l flow to 
the United States to replace in part its borrouin3 • .If instead, it 
borrowed in Paris, it would cause interest r~tcs there to rise and 
capital would flo~, to Paris. Thou~h gross flows would differ in the 
two cases, the final net flow would be similar in proportion as capital: 
markets are perfect, 4.e., to the extent that there were no barriers 
to free movi:ment. The importance of intern3tionc.1.l firf'.ls to capital 
movements therefore depends on the fac~ that in the real world, capital 
markets are highly iMperfect. 
t!hat is the inp2ct of r:1ultin2tfono.l fin1s- ia 2 ~1c,r1d !-!he:re info._·-
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are important f2.ctors? The 111ultinat:!.onal fin!S uould seem to be ideally 
plac.ed to c~rcur,wcnt these! ,barr3.ers; they ar·e in contact: uith capital 
marl:ets in nany cou.ntr:tes _and are l2rge enough to tal:e a,Jvantr.ge of 
econoDies of scale in borro-c-dng. I3y borronin2 in those countries T-Jhere 
capital is plentiful and lending ~~1ere it i~ scarce, the international 
firm both t12xir:dzcs its oi-m prof its and alloc2.tes cf.pital between coun-
tries more effectively. One mi~ht expect that ~ot only uould_they use 
"their international connection so as to draw their capital from the 
, . h . l . l, 19} , . ,cl1eapest r.iar,wt Hl eac. particu ar J.nstat....ce) out tney rr\1£nt even step 
acting as international financial intermediaries, lend to other firms 
less advantageously placed. 
Their behavior so far does not se2~ to bc~r out this conjecture. 
Instead~ they appear ~o behave as if co~straine<l ~o a some~~at inflexible 
I' 
pattern of: f in~nce i-rM.ch does not allot., them to vary greatly in adjust-
ing to local capital conditions. The patterri that emerges seems so~e­
what as follous: the American parent firm provides the equHy finance 
for its subsidiary and borrows much of the non-equity secud.ties locc.Ily. 
Statistically, the over-all pattern of United States direct invest­
ment is as follows. (The data are for 1957, the date of the last census, 
but the figures on flou of fund~ sug~est that the pattern has b~en main-
·tained.) In that year, the total assets of American subsidiaries abroad 
was about forty billion dollars, 60% of which was finan~ed from American 
sources end 40% frov lotal sources. The iocal participation was confined 
lare~ly to non-2quity securities; e~uity securities sold to local investors 
iccouuted for oniy ~% of total assets> ~,hilc·non-equity accounte~ for 32½. 
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To.put this enothcr way 1 the Amzrican ftrrn 2lloued local inv~stors to 
hold 75% of non-equity securities and o~ly 15l of equity securities. 
This pattcrri varies somewhat fron ~ountry to country, but not 
greatly. In Europe) for e;rnrr.plc, tl1e Arlerican subsidic.:!."ies and branch 
plants borroi, 5!;~~ locally, of t-zhich M;% is non:cquity and G9½ equity 
securities. Europeans o:-mecl 90;-'. of the non-equity securities outstand­
ing and only 15% of the equity securities. Tl1ere are probably two 
reasons ~1y local borrowing in Europe is ~reater than evcraee: the 
superior capital markets in Europe and the greater proportion of invest­
me11t in manufacturing, Phere· .short--term li.?..bili ties play £'. more irri-
portant role. 
One constraint whic:1 accounts in part for this behavior is risk 
aversion - a problem ,-;hich arises becaus-'~ _the firra is not truly inter-
national, but is in fact nationql. Each fir~ is incorporated in one
I
particular country and must pay its dividends in a ~articular currency; 
whenever it hc,s an uncovered asset in a foreit?,n country, it incurs 
an exchange ris7~, and its policy will be to minimize this risk subject
...,of course to cost conditions.· An American firm with assets in a sub-
sidiary in Franc~ worth two million dollars can reduce its exchange 
risk to the ext~nt that it covers its invcst~ent through borrotrinc in 
France. It iiill tend therefore•'to borrot-r as much as possiblc 1 or more 
accurately, to the point where the increase in costs is greater than.
the increase in risk. By the same reasoning 1 a Furopean firm i7ith a 
£:Ubsidfr.ry i~1 the United Suites t:ill borro,1 in A,12rica to cover its 
invesi::.ient ther.::. This is confir;:1'2d in· £2.ct; foreigi'. co~,,panies inv2s~-
ing in the United Stntcs follot1 the sa~2 ovei-all pattern described 
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above for /,oericr:n investmcnt.s. They Lo1.'ro~? SOX of their subsi,liar:tcs' 
needs loc~lly (i.e., in the United Stites), a32in largely in the form 
- .. - 20,:,f non-equity sccu:n. t :J. cs. 
The second rn2jor cor1strair:t on t!1c international fini"' s freeclo!!! 
- to borrou uh2.re cnpitc,l is cheapest is fr.~ ,~.es ire to maintv.in conplete 
c6ntr~1- of its subsidiary. Because Ancriczn aD.<l other r:1ultfo.c1tion<!.l 
. . .
fir.r.1s, :i.n the. p8.st at leest, hf.V~ been very reluctc'!nt to sell equity 
·securities in their subsidi2ries, the amount they can bcirrow.in a coun­
try is B.n.dted by the avail2.sility of non-2quity sources o-f finc:nce. 
"The reason for refusing to sell e~uity securities is in part the 
desire to maint2in control of the su~sidinry, but this is not the co~~ 
plctc expl2nition, since in precticc, the parent fire holds well 
above tha 50Z 00nQrship necessary for effective control; as noted 
above~ it is over 80%. Their desire to ca~ture all -~he monopoly 
';
profits 2n~ qJasi-rcnts associated with their subsidiary explains 
this to so8e extent. 
The r.1ulti.natiorwl finn is a means for ceritralizin5 decision 
lilaking. Its goal of harmonizing policies in different· countries in ... 
order to maximize ~orld-tdde profit may be difficult to accomplish if 
the firm is ericurnbcred. by the problems of l9c2l interest. To allou 
.•• 
local pa~ticipation re-i~troduccs soMe of the very forces tl1at direct. ~ 
investt.12nt is desi,sncd to avoid. Local s~s.rehold~rsJ interested only 
in the profits of their particular subsidiary, •rould not take into 
consider~tion the repercussion~ of their _policies on branch plants 2n 
oth-~r countries. YC!t if these itr.portc,C'.t repc,rcussions _2.re ir,nored, 
_, glol)~l pr-o.f its r,:ill fall short of the r,~axir..tiil. The fin! therefore 
attempts to cc:pture all profits in orc!cr to ma;-:fr:dze tl1em fully. 21 
Legal restrictions, improv2d capital markets, and a divorce of 
equity end control may lead to increased local s~le of equity sccuri-
ties. ·'l'his 1-mulcl 9rohably reduce fur the-.:- the flm,r of c2.pital associ-
ated with international business integration, since the equity securi-
ties· account for the mc:j or floi;-1 at present. The· role of multinational 
firms ~i's a substitute for international fincnc:i.al intermediaries would 
·be reduced. 
Wi may note finally the possibility of a curious relaiionship 
bet.ween direct investment and the interest rate, ~-,hich follows froo 
the fact t11at firfus tend ·to borro0 40 or 50% of the financial needs 
of their subsidiary locally in the co.1ntry of operatfon. The more 
eipensive is capital in a country, the higher the cost on this borrow-
ing, and this provides an incentive to borro11 a smaller prop~rtion 
I 
locally in the 
I 
country thnt has the highest interest rates. To this 
extend the flou of direct investment t-iiJ.l be incr~nscd. But there is 
an effect in the opposite direction as well. The high interest rates· 
red_uce profits and discourage investment; in other uords, it can re---­




Direct investrnent involves a pacl-:aGe of rwnc13e:rnent s!dlls, tech-
nical knoulcdge, .ri.nd capit?.l, and ft should brini a triplet 0£ hcneU.ts; 
the lendin3 country shou~d gain becuase its managers, tecln1icinns, and 
capital receive a hiRhcr rate of return abroad than they could at hcree, 
and the recipient country g~ins bccnus~ it.receives these factors of 
pro·duction at a Joper cost than it could provide them itself, if •indeed· 
it could provide them at all. 
There is also another side. The presence of multinatj_onal firms 
affec:'ts the_ dQgree of competition in an indus,try, aEd as a result l 
· its price and output. Dheri these are tcl~cn into consideration~ no 
• 1 t c>. •..:ei11Cn t s of· uni· -versa1 b r · • The effectss1mp e s ene.:. 1..: are poss 1."b1,_e. 
cliffer for the fin,1, for each of. the countries; ct"nd fot· the \7or1d. 
While the fira may be presumed to benefit, or to think it benefits, 
as otherwise it would not. unclertake the investment, uorld-1ncome may 
rise or fall, .depcn<li_ng on uhether coopctition and cfficiency is in-
- .• 
creased or decreased; and either or both- of the receiving and lending 
countries tilay gain or lose, depending on uhere the benefits and bur­
dens fall. 
The most trciublesome aspect of public policy on direct invest-
ment ii that, to be adequate, it must be international in scope. 
The effect is widespiea~, and all countries must cooperate is policy 
is to remove rather t~an aggravate the problc □. Since countries differ 
. .so _ereatly in their views and interests, it is_ difficult to see hoi-1 
c9operatfon to r.1itigate the bad effects of direct investo.ent znd to 
distribute the benefits equitably could be obt~in~d. Different atti-
'tudes towDrds competition and planPi1~ vou!d.have to be reconciled, 
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as uell as differc11t interests in the uay t!1e gains fror.1 direct invest-
mcnt are sl1arcd. Yet howev2r difficult, coop2ration on a global basis 
is essential; independsnt action by ouc country or one group of·coun-
tries would conflict with the interest of others and would probably -
result in retaliation. Already, sicns of 6~tually antagonistic rather 
.than mutually beneficial policies can be observed. 
Broadly spe~kinc, if cooperation could be achieved 3 one can 
envisage three types of remedies to the r,roblems created by the inter-, 
nationc=ll U.rm. 
The first alternative is ~o ~o nothing. The complexity of the 
problem provides ·a strong argllinen·t for this approach. Every case of 
international business integration has its positive and neg2tive as-
J>Ccts, an<l it is difficult to tell ~.,hcther it reduces costs or merely 
increases profits without enhancin3 the general welfare. There is 
reason to quc~tion uhethcr governments in these circumstances ~ould 
be able to evaluate correctly cJnc1 recommend appropriately·. Governmer!t 
errors in correcting the problem might turn out to ~e worse than the 
problem itself. The substantial benefits of foreign fovestment may be 
lost in the attempt to remove deficiencies. Under this view, the 
best thing uould be to rely on competitiori, imperfect as it is, to 
rectify the problcm 3 an<l to hofle that the p1·oblel1 is transitory, · 
that oligopoly positions will erode through time, and that benefits 
uill outweich costs. · 
A second line of attnck is control and resulation of multinntion2l 
...~ulation, and ~~1en it is imocrfect, the argument for planning is strength-
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ened. Under this v5.cH, constituted _authorities, jointly or imlepe.nc1-
ently, would prescribe good behavior for international companies, and 
regulate their policies on investment, enployraent, purchase~ and sales. 
: Gtddelj_nes and laws of this n2t.ure a:re already j_n force :1.n nearly 
..every country; anci they see,:1 likely to gro_w. 
A; third approach Hould be to atte::m~t to reI.:1ove, or at least lessen, 
barriers to entry ;,,n<l to increase competition. Even where coi:1.petition 
is no~ regarded as a goal, this t-wuld be of help, since by redud.ng_ 
the power of international firms, government control trould-be ~ade easier. 
It ndght be useful to state _briefly a number of policies which m:!.ght 
be considered. 
1, Since nn irnport~nt advant2ge of large firms ii their superior 
access to capitDl, steps could be tal~en to inprove the capital market. 
By ma1~ing capital more reedily available in countries where H is not, 
the advantage of foreign firms might be reduced. The direct costs of 
subsidizing a good capital market -might.be far less than the hidden 
cost of conglomerate enterprise and high concentration. 
·2. In addition, it t!lay be possible to restrain sorne•-1hat the ,-1ay--, 
in which firms use their advantage. For exc1raple, tactics designed to 
.....• 
exclude new competition could be restricted, and entry encourejed. 
To this encl, there is need for an investigation of exclusive dealing 
arrangements, tied sales, full line forcing, adninistration of patent 
rights, etc. 
3 <l • t n • 22 h . , •• Accor in~ o vain, t .e most 1Qportant Qa:rier to entry, 
discovered by detailed study, ~as pro~uct differentiation. If this pre­
vails in the international econoray as.well, it su3sests tl1e advent2g~s 
.-
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of. Iconsll::1er education ffi,<l -protection. It r,1ight thc:cefore be 2d-vis2.ble 
to limH sales p:ro;;{otior:al activities nnd prov:Ld8 in:for,n2t:i.on services 
to counter its effects. 
4. There collld also be an attack on the proble~ of resource 
monopolization. The ~clvantagc of nultinatloaal firms someti~es lies in 
con.trol of a strategic nei;r material. Steps might be taken to moke 
this raw material available to all on an equal basis. (At the same time, 
the country ,~ere the raw material is located, often an undcrdev~loped 
count1·y, migh.t be able to get a better share .than it does ,-,1wn dealing 
with large oligopolistic firros!) 
5. Competition could also be increased by reRoving those tariff 
and other barriers which protect- monopolies. Thfs i-·ould rwke it _easier 
fo·r a small firm to enter r.iarl~ets uithollt cs tablishi,10 pro(1uction 
facilities in a foreirn country.· 
6. In certain cases, it might b~ desirable to prevent expansion 
of certain firr:is or even to force a dissolution. This.is an extreoc 
solution, but it has been used in certain cases in the United States, 
and may also be ac!vantagcous in an international context. 
We might end on the follod.ng note=· discussions of intcnwti.onal 
business often contain a large element of nationalism; countries feel 
that what is good fer ti1eir business fhms is eood for the country, and 
try to promote their. ip.terests. America supports A:~erican firms because 
they- are /'J;lerican, while foreign countries object to the:n for the sam2 
reason. Re suGgest that th~ problem shoulJ he vie~~d. fro2 _e uore glob2l 
·of the r::ost ir::portant prc:ible~s are asso•:fofcd ~-dth size end r.1z,-cl:et 
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rather then with nationality, and more attehtion should be focused on 
these aspects. 
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before 19~6. Since few plnnts were established citl1cr <lurini the depression 
or the war, n1ost of these plants must have started before 1930. This is 
confin1cc.1 :in th2 1950 CetlSUS (United States tiep,~rtir.ent of CO:i'J!;Cl"C('., _Qir_~~~
Private Fo,:ej_f;•l Inv,2.2.t,,,snts of the Urii tcd St.:t!:es: ___ Census of 1950, Hm;hinz-· 
ton: Governr:cnt P::.:-:i.nU.nzr, Office, 1953), H!lich :found that a.lmost 60 per 
cent of th2 investr;,.c.nts at that U.rne were in plnnts es~nblishcd before 
1930. 
Other evidence on the venerability of most foreign investora can be 
found i.n the cz.se h:Lstories report in c. Lew_i_s, America's StJ:.l_kc in Int.?_z­
nnt:i.onal_ Invcstric~1ts (Fashi~gton 1 D. C.: The DrooI~ings Instit1.1t:i.on, 1933);
R. Harslrnll, F. A. Southard, and I-:. Taylor, ~_anac15an-l'.meris-..?I1 Inch.•.sti;_y_ 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936) ~ D. H. Phelps, H:i.~ratio~i 
Jn<l1._!._s_~.D~to So,•.th Ane_ri~ (1!2.~-1 York: NcGrau-Eill P.ook Co., 1936): and 
F. A. Southard, Art~erican Industry in Europe (Boston: Hotighton H:i.fflin 
Co., 1931). In this lost uork, Southard was able to trace the orieins 
of many firms back to the late 19th ccntu~y . 
. Direct investment by foreigners in the United States cppears also 
to bd in old, well-established subsidiaries.· Of the 6 biliion dollars 
of direct investment in the United States, almost GO per cent were 
estnhlishe<l before 19l1J.. (U. S. Departnent of Co1::it~crce, Fo_reif{n I\usj~T}_ess
_lnvestt(lent in the United States_, Vashington: Goverm,tent Pri.Eting Office,
1961, p. liO) 
8 . . 
In Can2da, for example, the share of foreign firms hos shmm 110 · 
tendency to fall c>.ncl is incre2.sir.g. (Goverm1ent of Can2.c1a, Do~ninion 
Bureau of Statistics, C2nada's International Investment Position. 1926-
195/i, Ottaua: Queen's Printer, 1958) In E;glaml Dunning f ounc1 only a 
very slight decline, helped by the war) in the A.med.can share of British 
industry. (Dunning, E.2.· c:i.t., p. 1311, Of the 115 firms questioned,
only 15 claimed that their share decreased; 63 firms reported an in-
crease, and 37, no change.) In· the United States, in some industries, 
£iris formerly owned by foreisners have given way to local firms; but 
these t•.'ere special cases resulting from the war, when- German subsid­
iaries were seized an<l some British firms sold to m2·ct exchange re­
quirements of the United Kingdom. Some of the British firms have '• 
since bought back their interes_ts. (See Dcpartr:1ent of Cou,mcrce, For­
ei.r,n Business Investsents in the United Stc>.tes, ££· £it., p. 3, for 
.a description of past investments in the United States and the reasons 
for.the disappearance of some of them.) 
9up till no•,.,, s-ome of the most important acts of governr.,ent policy • 
towards direct investment have'been connected to balance of payments
problems. Direct invcstraent has bee~ treated as onothar form of c~pital
and the flon of funds associatecl with it so;cietises perr.titterl, som~tir.1es 
not~ acc~rding to balence of payments.criteria. This involves an at-
•tempt to manipulate a long~term factor for_short-ter~ purposes, ancl has 
many undesirable coas~quences. Firms, on the oth-~r hc.-id, acconlin3 to 
a· study by the rational IndustriGl Confci2nc~ ~card, have te~cn a 
dccirlcdJ.y di~i:erent vie,.!. T~ey 2.re· r-,ot as r,1ue'.1 conce:.:-r:ed nith short-
.':. . 
;• . 
prof:lt rates {n m.:11:ing ir-.vzstment decisions v.3 \7:i.th t~1e ';prot.cction of 
competitive. position in a mm·ket. :• The rl:i.sc:ussicn of this Pf".per su~gests 
. that e.n h1portcnt guide for public policy be protc~ction of compcthive 
perfon.12nce. (Judd Poll-:, Irene H. !'.eistcr; Lc:l·Ter,ce A. Veit J _1L.~..•­
Production Ahro?..ci .:\PC- the Dalance of Pay~tcr.ts, :reu York: ifational 
Industrial Conference Roardl 1966) 
10
United State:, Dcparti!icr:t of Corr:rnercc, Unite~ States Business 
lPvestr~cnt in Foreign Co1:!ntd.~~, 'fas!.lin-:;ton: Goverme1er,t Printer" 1~57,
p'.1)~!1. 
· 11ihe list cf firms was obtained from an investigation of financial 
reports. Asset size uas o1;tained fros:1 the 196l: £grtune D_irectory. 
12The list of fin~s is roughly the sene as the one used above. 
Concentration ratios Here tal·:en fror-: the U. S. Ser<!te, Concer!tratio::i 
in Ainericc1.n }!1d1:!_str.Y.., P-erort of tbe Subco,,nittec or,..~ntitru;t e.1:d ii;nop­
oly pursuant to S. Res. 57 (25th Con?ress), Table 17, p. 23. The firms 
were classified according to their major product, but their direct 
· investrnents··are ofteP- restricted to or1e or tuo speci.2,lt:i.es in ~1h:i.cl~ the 
firm has particular advantages. Concentration ratios ir: these special­
ties are rnuch hiBher a better industry definition woul~ therefore 
show an even stronrrcr association betwcen_investsc~t and high concen-
- trption. 
Moreover, many fir!ns were in iE<lustries ,,here procuct differentia­
tion t,:as important and Phcre the concentre.t;i.on rc>.tio is a poor index 
of market position because of the difficulty of defining an industry. 
The industries of high concentration (32 firDs) ~ere: 
75-100% Concentration----,---- ----
Cereal, B~eakfast Foods 2 
Chewing Gun 2 
Flavoring for Soft Drinks 3 -
Hard Surface Floor 
. Coverfogs . 1 
Tires & Inner Tubes 5 
Flat Glass 1 
Tobacco 1 
Aluminum 1 
Tin Cans & Other Tirnmre 2 · 
Razors l Razor Blades 1 
Computing !fachines & 
Typeuriters 4 
.Sewing ?-'achiP.cs 1 
Shoe Machinery 1 
Motor Vehicles 6 
Locomotives & Perts 1 
32 
. The following infustries ~ere in the 50-74% ratio bracket (11 firms): 
50-74~ Concentration·-·--------
Biscuits & Crackers 1 
A1rasiv!:!s ~-
Cleanin6 l, P-olisl'j_n3 
Corn Fet Filljni; · 1 
Asbestos 1 
Photographic Equipment 1 
Soaps & Glyceri~e 2 
. ·p1umbine Fixtures 2 
Elevators &Escalators 1 
Vacuum Cleaners 1 
11 
In the 25-49Z concentration r~tio brac~et (2~ firms) were: 
25-49% Concentration 
Heat Products · 4 
Ceffient l 
l~dicinal 1 ChcRical, 
Dairy Products 2 
Canne:d .Fruits {, Vegs. 3 
Flour (, Fe'2.1 1 
Refractories 1 
Surgical AppU;:.r.ces 1 
Mattresses & ~e~ Springs 1 
& Pharmaceutical 
l-. Preparations 6 
I 
' 
I, Pai~ts i Varnishes l 
Tractors & Farm i-fachinery 5· 
Oil Field Machi~ery & 
Tools 1 
Printing Trade Equipment 
& Hachinery 1 
28 
O~e firm, Construction &Minini Machinery, was· in industry ~ith less than 
25% concentration, and foi t~enty-six others, it was not possible to 
• assign concentration ratios due to the diversified nature of the firms. 
13n1.mning·, .£Q• cit., p. lp, Horeover, this is probably an under- • 
estimate, since differenti2ted1 products play an importnat role in some 
of the unconcentrntcd industries, e.g., foundation garments> propri~tary
medicines, beauty and toilet preparations. 
lli
I. Brecher and S. S. Reisman, Canada-United States Econo~ic 
· Rel~iQ_ns, Ot tc>.'·'ct: Royal Co::1 □ issio.1 on C2.nada' s Ecot10mic Prospects,




1~F. A. Southard, knerican_Industrv in_Euro9e, Bostoni Roughton 
Mifflin Co., 1931. See esp2cia!ly l1is com~ents oa the electrical equip­
ment j_nclust.r,, p. 36; telephone_ aarl. telegraphic c-:quip,!\en.t, p. 55; petro­
leum, p. 60, 68-69; motor vehicles) p. 29; mines and fol~taJ.s) p. 93; 
phonographs, p. 103; and locks end keys, p. 108. Also sec G. Y. Bertin, 
· ·1 1:i.r/,,cstj_ssC:;·,12nt ·a~s fin::es e~rc~E:eres en Frc1_~ce, P. U. F., 1963. 
16D. T. Brash, United States Investn~nt in f,ustr2.1ian rJm1ufc1cturin<:!. 
_I_ngnstry, Doctor2l Dissertation, I.tis trali2n i'~c:tional University, August 
l.965. 
liln the case of vertical integration, an improvement in coor­
dination would tend to improve efficiency of allocation _on both counts. 
Suppose He have·a monopolist, A, se~ling to .:1nothcr finil, B, which is 
in turn a monopolist in another market, A·doublc distortion is involved 
j.n this case of scqu2ntinl monop0ly; if A ai1d B integrnte or collucle 
perfect1y to rnm:i;:lize joint profits) they ui'll re;Pove one of the dis­
tortions _and in so doing,· i:icreas12 output and _lo,,er price. 
18
Kaysen and Turner, op. cit. , p. 9. 
19c. Iverson, lnternatior,2.l C21)~tal J.iover.,Cr!~_§., London: Oxford 
University Press, 1935, p. 146. Ohlin 1:iakes the s2;:1e point and is 
quoted by Iverson. See B. Ohlin, Interrer:;ionc!:_2-_~ncl. Intcrnationa~ 
Trade, Cambridge: llarvard University Press~ 1935, p. 334. 
20U. S. DeparLmenL of Commerce, Foreign Business Investment 




We may state the argur.ient more precisely as follous: dire.ct 
investment occurs because the profits of an enterprise in one country, 




To maximize global prqfits (w + n ) the following must hold:1 2 
(2) 
-1 
Suppose, however, that th~ parent firm owns the ~nterprise in country 1 
·fully, but only~ per cent of the ~nterprise in ccu~try 2. Then it will 
whi-ch only fuliy cxplo:.i.ts globaJ. interdependence if ;>.. equds 1. The 
_-analysis assumes that firms try to maximize total-profits lesally bc­
loneing to shareholdr2rs of the parent firm. An alternative assu•nption 
is that firms vie:~, all dividends, including those paid to shc:lrehoJ.<lers 
in the home country~ as a cost, and attempt to maximize retained earnings. 
Le~tinz d and d2 be clividcnJs p2icl in cou.ntry 1 and country 2 respectively,1 
the firm maximizes (n + u - a
1 
, -d2) insteed of (u - An ) as above.1 2 1 2 
Provided dividends in each c6untry do not dep~n<l on profits-earned in 
that country, i.e.> they depend only on total profits and the conditions 
prcvailine in the capital market in ~ach country, equity securities 
introduce no distorlio~ in the production decision of the type described 
above result. I am grateful to Hrs. E. Penrose for this point. 
22
J. S. nain 1 Barriers to t!£u Conpetition; Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1956. 
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